-尊龙游戏旗舰厅官网
��ࡱ�>�� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ �r�#�bjbj�)�)2��c�g�c�g�i
�������66������������8��$�sr������"""�q�q�q�q�q�q�q$9t��vf�q9�"""""�q����4
r"������q"�q��������g�������.�q#r0sr5w"�5wb15w�nnl"""""""�q�q�h"""sr""""��������������������������������������������������������������������5w"""""""""6b�: governance
volume 36, issue 2, april 2023
1. title: political and administrative control of expert groups�a mixed-methods study
authors: stine hesstvedt, johan christensen
abstract: governments face a fundamental dilemma when asking expert groups for advice. experts possess knowledge that can help governments design effective and legitimate policies. however, they can also propose different policies than those preferred by government. how do governments solve this conundrum? through a mixed-methods study, the article examines politico-administrative control with expert advisory commissions in norway. arguing that both politicians and bureaucrats can take interest in limiting the gap between political/administrative policy preferences and expert group output, the article examines by what means they seek to control expert groups and how control varies across policy portfolios. it finds that while politicians rely on control by design, bureaucrats use both design and interventions. moreover, political and bureaucratic controls are stronger in the area of financial/economic policy than elsewhere. the article makes a novel contribution to scholarship at the intersection of public administration and knowledge and policymaking.
2. title: policy diffusion through leadership transfer networks: direct or indirect connections?
authors: weixing liu, hongtao yi
abstract: change agents play important roles in the diffusion of policy innovation. scholars argue that the career paths of change agents could facilitate the diffusion of innovation through network-based mechanisms of portable innovation or policy wormholes, but have not fully distinguished between direct and indirect connections inherently important in a leadership transfer network. this study proposes an indirect portable innovation hypothesis and an indirect policy wormhole hypothesis to highlight the effects of leadership transfer networks through indirect network connections, extending the agent network diffusion (and) model. we test the hypotheses empirically with the diffusion of local financial subsidy policies for new energy vehicles (nevs) among cities in china from 2009 to 2016. the results confirm the effects of direct and indirect portable innovation and policy wormholes.
3. title: collaborative public sector innovation: an analysis of italy, japan, and turkey
authors: emre cinar, chris simms, paul trott
abstract: the importance of involving citizens in the early stages of public sector innovation and bottom-up governance arrangements for collaboration has been proposed in a number of theoretical papers. however, to date, few empirical studies are evident in the literature. to deepen our understanding of collaborative public sector innovation, our exploratory article analyses: (i) the actors of collaboration, (ii) collaboration across the innovation stages, (iii) the perceived aspects of collaboration for innovative outcomes, and (iv) the governance of collaboration. our analysis covers 99 innovations from italy, japan, and turkey. we reveal that collaboration still largely occurs within the bureaucracy of public sector organizations. attempts to include civic and private sectors are evident, depending on the country context. further, we uncover that a mutual understanding and shared goals are crucial for success, which is accomplished through top-down governance as opposed to self-governed bottom-up networks.
4. title: the godfather provides: enduring corruption and organizational hierarchy in the kenyan police service
authors: njoroge mutahi, makena micheni, milli lake
abstract: despite government commitments to mitigate corruption and strengthen mechanisms of accountability in state security sectors, reform efforts frequently fail to curb illegal practices by state agents. scholars offer explanations that range from deeply embedded societal norms of appropriate behavior to rational accounts emphasizing the individualized benefits corruption can offer. using a case study of the service standing orders in kenya's national police service however, we build on the work of persson et al.'s analysis to show how corrupt practices on the part of street-level agents are reinforced within organizational hierarchies, through institutionalized�rather than personalized�incentives and obligations. as a result, policy innovations that do not explicitly identify the countervailing incentives created through internal command structures are likely to miss potentially fruitful avenues for institutional reform.
5. title: the prime minister's constitution: cabinet rulebooks in westminster democracies
authors: nicholas barry, narelle miragliotta, zim nwokora
abstract: the transformation of governance in westminster democracies is well documented. however, one aspect of their change that has not received much attention is the creation and publication of cabinet rulebooks. the few studies of cabinet rulebooks have focused on their potential constitutional implications, leaving unclear how their emergence fits within the broader development of westminster governance. we address this gap in the literature by examining cabinet rulebooks in five westminster democracies: australia, canada, ireland, new zealand, and the united kingdom. we analyze their features and emergence, and then set out a framework to analyze their potential effects on cabinet dynamics. we find that the appearance of cabinet rulebooks can be tied to several forces of change in westminster systems, but most especially the growth of government. furthermore, we find that these rulebooks project an account of prime ministerial power that is favorable to the prime minister.
6. title: from quiet to noisy politics: varieties of european reactions to 5g and huawei
authors: antonio calcara
abstract: 5g networks are at the center of geopolitical competition. the united states has denounced market leader huawei's ability to break into allies' sensitive networks and it has tried to convince europeans to ban the chinese group from their 5g markets. how are european governments and industries reacting to 5g politicization? this article argues that government-industry interactions in the handling of politically salient issues are mediated by the country's political system. in executive-dominated countries, the government would centralize policymaking. in parliament-dominated countries, the government would delegate politically salient issues to the industry to bypass diffuse power-sharing and fragmented coalition-building. the article adds that political economy acts as an intervening variable. in public governance ecosystems, governments and industries interact through informal coordination; in private governance ecosystems, the two actors rely on formal contracting. the empirical analysis focuses on british, dutch, french, and italian reactions to 5g politicization, yielding favorable results to the hypotheses.
7. title: resisting public monitoring in authoritarian regimes: evidence from local environmental litigation in china
authors: xiao zhu, taotao qiu, dongshu liu
abstract: civic activism is increasingly popular for authoritarian regimes to ensure local compliance and improve local governance, but it also places pressure on local officials. how do local officials respond to such pressures? with a unique dataset of city-level environmental investigations and public interest litigation in china, we conduct a generalized difference-in-difference analysis and find that public interest litigation, a new legal channel for social actors to monitor environmental governance, can significantly reduce information disclosure related to investigations. furthermore, it changes the focus of investigations: the number of low-profile investigations is increased, while the number of high-profile cases is decreased. this finding reveals how local officials avoid public monitoring by reducing information disclosure but maintaining a certain level of enforcement, which implies that the effect of civic engagement on the accountability of local governments in authoritarian regimes is dynamic with the coevolution of strategies of local officials and civil societies.
8. title: separation of powers, opposition strength, and chief executives' strategy
authors: don s. lee, zsuzsanna b. magyar
abstract: one of the main questions about presidential democracies is to what extent the legislature influences executive governance. however, less well-known in this literature is the influence of opposition parties in policy-making and government formation processes. we argue that, in multiparty presidential governments, more concentrated opposition forces in the legislature, as opposed to more fragmented, lead to higher government spending and greater chances of coalition formation. facing more united opposition, presidents who are concerned about passing their agenda in the legislature are willing to pay the price to hold their ruling party or governing coalition together in tighter unity. we test this logic by analyzing data on government spending and cabinet formation in all multiparty presidential democracies in east and southeast asia and find strong support for it, controlling for several political and economic variables. our analysis further shows that chief executives' electoral incentives strongly shape their budget spending and cabinet appointments.
9. title: co-financing community-driven development through informal taxation: evidence from south-central somalia
authors: vanessa van den boogaard, fabrizio santoro
abstract: community contributions are often required as part of community-driven development programs, with contributions encouraged through matching grants. however, little remains known about the impact of matching grants or the implications of requiring community contributions�also known as informal taxation. we explore this research gap through a randomized control trial of a matching grant program in gedo region in south-central somalia. we find that matching grants can increase informal taxation and serve as an effective means of delivering public goods. moreover, we find that the program strengthened local government legitimacy, despite the local government playing no direct role in the program. these findings deepen our understanding of how matching grants may contribute to community-driven development in a context of weak institutional capacity, while pointing to potential complementarities between state and non-state actors in governance and service provision, formal and informal institutions, and formal and informal taxation.
10. title: colonial origins of modern bureaucracy? india and the professionalization of the british civil service
authors: agnes cornell, ted svensson
abstract: this article examines the diffusion of meritocratic practices as a potential instance of policy transfer by scrutinizing the introduction of open and competitive examinations during the mid-nineteenth century in the british civil service. scholars have argued that british reformers were inspired by meritocratic practices in british-ruled india. in order to assess this claim, we combine qualitative analysis of archival material documenting the interdepartmental debates on meritocratic reforms in the british home civil service as well as in the indian civil service with quantitative analyses of unique data on the implementation of examinations with open competition in british public offices and the india experience of heads of departments. our qualitative and quantitative analyses largely reject the idea that the indian civil service was a key source of inspiration for british merit reforms. while our quantitative analyses show some, albeit weak, evidence, no such evidence was found in the qualitative analysis.
11. title: conflict and salience as drivers of corporate lobbying? an elite survey experiment
authors: ellis aizenberg
abstract: this paper argues that a high degree of conflict and a low degree of salience on a policy issue drives corporations to lobby alone rather than via a business association. previous research has addressed drivers at organizational, sector and structural level. this paper adds an issue perspective. these arguments are important as democracies thrive when business employs its power in a responsible manner. when corporations lobby alone, it can be a challenge to do so as they tend to overlook long-term interests of the broader business community and society. the arguments are tested for the first time in a corporatist context through an original survey experiment among corporate lobbyists in germany and the netherlands. the study finds support for the expectation on conflict, which is striking as it indicates that corporations prefer to lobby alone due to conflict even in contexts in which they are not incentivized to do so.
12. title: condemned to complexity? growing state activity and complex policy systems
authors: julian limberg, christoph knill, yves steinebach
abstract: does growing state activity inevitably lead to more complex policy systems? in this article, we offer a new, comprehensive approach that systematically differentiates between the size and the complexity of policy portfolios to answer this question. looking at data from 21 oecd countries over more than three decades (1980�2015) in the areas of social and environmental policy, we find substantial variation in the size and complexity of policy portfolios. while larger state activity is generally associated with growing complexity, this relation still varies both between countries and over time. our finding suggests that increasing policy complexity is not a �natural given� but that two of the major trends of the last decades�growing state activity and global political integration�provided a very fertile ground that fosters policy complexity. these findings have important implications for analyzing macro patterns of state activity in the 21st century.
13. title: does the cradle of power exist? sequence analysis of top bureaucrats' career trajectories
authors: amalie trangb�k
abstract: top bureaucrats are the nexus between politics and administration. besides being the chief operating officer of the ministry, they are technical experts and political advisors to the minister. this makes them central actors in bureaucratic studies. despite their powerful position, few have studied their path to power. utilizing sequence analysis, i analyze the career trajectories of permanent secretaries, providing a rich measure of career paths. denmark is used as a case of a european parliamentary system, and a novel dataset has been collected containing career information on permanent secretaries from 1925 to 2020. the analysis reveals five ideal-typical career paths and illustrates how career trajectories have become more diverse over time. fewer top bureaucrats are rising through the ranks within a single ministry; instead, there has been an increase in inter-ministerial shifts and in experience providing political craft. finally, the position is becoming a steppingstone rather than the final position.
14. title: gender system and corruption: patriarchy as a predictor of �fairness�
authors: mattias ottervik, zheng su
abstract: this article tests gender system as a mediator in the relationship between gender and corruption. using data from world values survey we find a robust, significant link between acceptance of patriarchy and acceptance of corruption. we also find a significant link between acceptance of male superiority and acceptance of corruption. in the relationship between gender and attitudes toward corruption, gender system is a consistently statistically significant predictor of acceptance of corruption whereas gender is not. the predictive power of acceptance of patriarchy and male superiority on corruption holds even with extensive controls. these results provide insight into the link between gender and corruption and suggest some of the wide-ranging effects of gender system on the political system.
15. title: strategic fiscal spending: evidence from china
authors: youngjoon lee
abstract: what are the effects of citizen grievances on autocrats' fiscal spending? i argue that autocrats will increase fiscal spending only when grievances may jeopardize stability. i hypothesize that when internet penetration is high, a marginal increase in labor strikes and administrative lawsuits leads to increased spending on social welfare, health, education, and housing support. evidence from china's 31 provinces (2006�2019) supports this hypothesis. the results are robust to instrumental variable strategies. the results may run against the expectations of the �selectorate theory� which posits that autocrats are generally disinclined to increase spending for citizens. my theory and evidence suggest that grievances will be perceived differently by autocrats according to different levels of connectivity, leading to different levels of spending.
�nn/ffnċ�
16. title: the palgrave handbook of co-production of public services and outcomes. by loeffler, e., cham, switzerland: palgrave macmillan. 2021
authors: anna uster
abstract: the article reviews the book �the palgrave handbook of co-production of public services and outcomes� by elke loeffler and tony bovaird.
17. title: kings as judges: power, justice, and the origins of parliaments. by deborah boucoyannis, cambridge university press. pp. 386
authors: carl henrik knutsen
abstract: the article reviews the book �kings as judges: power, justice, and the origins of parliaments� by deborah boucoyannis.
18. title: the dictator�s dilemma at the ballot box: electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies. by masaaki higashijima, ann arbor: university of michigan press. 2022
authors: yujin woo
abstract: the article reviews the book �the dictator�s dilemma at the ballot box: electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies� by masaaki higashijima.
19. title: social protection under authoritarianism: health politics and policy in china. by xian huang, oxford: oxford university press. 2020.
authors: samantha a. vortherms
abstract: the article reviews the book �social protection under authoritarianism: health politics and policy in china� by xian huang.
20. title: indebted societies credit and welfare in rich democracies. by andreas wiedemann, cambridge university press
authors: elsa clara massoc
abstract: the article reviews the book �indebted societies credit and welfare in rich democracies� by andreas wiedemann.
21. title:
$'()* ,-6��ʹ�ʘʘ�zkwobb4h�"�hu<�5�ojqj^jh�ud5�ojqj^jo(h�"�h�"�o(&h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jajo(ht�5�cjojqj^jajh�]5�cjojqj^jajh
2e5�cjojqj^jaj#h�aih�ai5�cjojqj^jajh�ai5�cjojqj^jaj h��5�cjojqj^jajo(#h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jaj h$-�5�cjojqj^jajo(#h�aih�ai5�cjojqj^jaj* ,����=
^
��<ikl���r56������������������������gd�psgd)w�gd$?�gdto�gd�l$gd%j,gdu<�gd�"�$a$gdt46����������� �
�
��������
<
=
>
e
f
�������ְ�����������}�o}aaqoo}hvi�h�l$5�ojqj^jo(h�'�h�'�5�ojqj^jh�l$h�l$5�ojqj^jh�l$5�ojqj^jo(hj�5�ojqjo(hiht4ojqj^jo(h�aih�aiojqj^jhihj�ojqj^jo(ht45�ojqj^jo(hicy5�ojqj^jh�"�hu<�5�ojqj^jhj�5�ojqj^jo(h�aih�ai5�ojqj^jf
s
]
^
g
h
�
����������;<=deq^hir����ÿ����������}o�aaqoo�aaaqohvi�hto�5�ojqj^jo(h��h��5�ojqj^jhto�hto�5�ojqj^jhto�hto�h�"�h�`�5�ojqj^jhto�5�ojqj^jo(h%j,5�ojqjo(hihu<�ojqj^jo(h�'�h�'�ojqj^jhih�l$ojqj^jo(h�l$h�l$5�ojqj^jhvi�h�l$5�ojqj^jo(h�'�h�'�5�ojqj^jrssssjklmouv���������������������̿����x�������x�j]]]]]]]]hj �hj �ojqj^jh�)h$?�ojqj^jo(hvi�h$?�5�ojqj^jo(hj �hj �5�ojqj^jh$?�5�ojqj^jo(h$?�h$?�5�ojqj^jh�"�h%j,5�ojqj^jhs/�5�ojqj^jo(h%j,5�ojqjo(hihanojqj^jh��h��ojqj^jh�)hto�ojqj^jo(#������� !1fqr[\����4567���˽ٯ����ٯ����uhhhhhhhhhz�mhr7a5�ojqj^jo(hvi�h)w�ojqj^jo(h.^ph.^pojqj^jh}onh)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jhvi�h)w�5�ojqj^jo(hvi�h�ps5�ojqj^jh.^ph.^p5�ojqj^jh�psh�ps5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh�ps5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(hvi�h%j,ojqj^jo(79?@������������ � !�!"�"##### #���ⱥ��ȝ���sssssssssssezm�h|�5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(hvi�h)w�ojqj^jo(h`�h`�ojqj^jh}onh)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jhvi�h)w�5�ojqj^jo(hvi�hvi�5�ojqj^jhvi�hr7a5�ojqj^jh`�h`�5�ojqj^jhr7a5�ojqj^jo(hr7ahr7a5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^j6��##�#�#
((_(�(�,�,3-g-�1�1�12'6(6�6�6o:p:�:�������������������������gd�s�gd�_gdlz�gd�)ggd|�gd)w�gdr7a #&#'#�#�#�#�#�#�#�#�#�#�#$�$%�%&�&'�'( (
((((������������������sh[mh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh�)g5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(hvi�h)w�ojqj^jo(h�h%h�h%ojqj^jh}onh)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jhvi�h)w�5�ojqj^jo(h�h%h�h%5�ojqj^jhvi�h|�5�ojqj^jh�yqh�yq5�ojqj^jh|�5�ojqj^jo(h|�h|�5�ojqj^j(((^(_(`(g(h(t(�(�(�(�(�()�)*�* � ,�,�,�,�,�,�,��������ָ������������vi[mhlz�hlz�5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jhr5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(hvi�h)w�ojqj^jo(h�]�h�]�ojqj^jhih)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jhvi�h)w�5�ojqj^jo(hvi�h�)g5�ojqj^jh�]�h�]�5�ojqj^jh�)g5�ojqj^jo(h�)gh�)g5�ojqj^j�,�,-2-3-4-<-v-f-g-p-q-.q./q/0q01q1�1�1�1�1�1�1�������幫�����������wj\nh�_h�_5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jhr5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(hvi�h)w�ojqj^jo(h6l~h6l~ojqj^jhih)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jhvi�h)w�5�ojqj^jo(hlz�hlz�5�ojqj^jhvi�hlz�5�ojqj^jh6l~h6l~5�ojqj^jhlz�5�ojqj^jo(�1�1�1�1�12222%2&23$34$45$56$6&6'6(6*6,62636������幫�����������wj\njh�s�h�s�5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh�s�5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(h}onh)w�ojqj^jo(h�h�ojqj^jhih)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jhvi�h)w�5�ojqj^jo(h�_h�_5�ojqj^jhvi�h�_5�ojqj^jh�h�5�ojqj^jh�_5�ojqj^jo(36�6�6�6�6�6�6�6�6�67�78�89�9:n:o:p:r:t:z:[:�:�:�:�:��������������uhz�hl���hw#�hw#�5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh�s�5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(h[h)w�ojqj^jo(h�j�h�j�ojqj^jh}onh)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jh[h)w�5�ojqj^jo(h[h[5�ojqj^jh�s�h�s�5�ojqj^jh[h�s�5�ojqj^jh�j�h�j�5�ojqj^j�:�:�:�:�:�:�:�:;v;<v<=v=>v>�>�>�>�>�>�>�>?????*? ?�����ŷ������������vh�zzlhhz�h[h�s�5�ojqj^jh�ish�is5�ojqj^jh�s�h�s�5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh�s�5�ojqj^jo(h�~�5�ojqjo(h[h)w�ojqj^jo(hw#�hw#�ojqj^jhih)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jh[h)w�5�ojqj^jo(hw#�hw#�5�ojqj^jh�9�h[5�ojqj^j�:�:�>�>? ?4c5c�c�c�f�fg'gkkkkl3l�l�lomlm�m�m�n��������������������������gd
�gdmw�gd)w�gd�s� ?4?5?t?@t@atabtbc3c4c5c6c7c9c?c@c�c�c�c�c�c�c�c�c�c�����������ƚ����zl^��lln��h[h)w�5�ojqj^jo(h[hmw�5�ojqj^jh�l�h�l�5�ojqj^jhmw�5�ojqj^jo(hmw�hmw�5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh)w�5�ojqj^jo(h�s�5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(h[h)w�ojqj^jo(h�ish�isojqj^jhih)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^j�cd�de�ef�f�f�f�f�f�f�f�f�fggggg&g'g0g1g���������Ϳ������ss�cughih)w�ojqj^jo(h$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jh$?�h
�5�ojqj^jo(hmw�h
�5�ojqj^jh[h
�5�ojqj^jh|h|5�ojqj^jh
�5�ojqj^jo(h
�h
�5�ojqj^jh
�h
�h�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh�s�5�ojqj^jo(h)w�5�ojqjo(h[h)w�ojqj^jo(h�l�h�l�ojqj^j1gaghahiaij�j
kkkkkk"k&k2k4klll l(l2l3l�����������ź����vvfxxvhh$?�h)w�5�ojqj^jo(hmw�h
�5�ojqj^jh[h)w�5�ojqj^jo(h�i�h�i�5�ojqj^jh
�5�ojqj^jo(h
�h
�5�ojqj^jh�"�h)w�5�ojqj^jh�s�5�ojqj^jo(h�i�5�ojqjo(h�i�5�ojqjh�i�h�i�5�ojqjo(h)w�5�ojqjh[h)w�ojqj^jo(h|h|ojqj^j3l���c���ݓ�v�u�a
��6f�������͌�n�|q�sax\��
���>�8�����o����( �b\�'x�77?��ڐ!����@5?�2�xy}xf�kp���gh�%v�ވ��
�����b���������|���g_���9�ѣ`(�b-�)�(������b"�{g��|07`�]�p�eb�_�?����1�r��!��?s���`��m�-�ʥ�v�_�\ĵ��j�������ns.���j�4����cw��\ zxc��筲�����/-���x��kp�//����z�֯a)���������_�bj���p��5f�� cf����r�]]�*�q�
yv)c�e��c��p@�$�=9i��!�_�������vhb�%(fv��va
��ߒ���602�- "�o�9idͿ
z}r�����'�=y�����s�z�%�����{��w�<����wo�~����omͩv�{����_�8}���:�oq�3�]a���c�.�`���/&�
1%��@�) �-z� �ȁ�cۏ�9t����"� �x��;adw�uɲ^��ln���m��m�]��\�(���'pb�ke#���b�c�{l��cw���k�� 6����q��kzv6�b�$��l\!ޖov�{uf]�n�# ���]l-7�bc�"��.����$c�΄�m\kh�t�)�z,�kf��~���apܜaߥ��frif.�;�1�d�f��ą�84����(��t�w����k�����>�v�ϯ����qw���[�y�ۙ�!®r��#��nq�̎�8�r{c���c�ާu�x>�i���lcwb�fv������f�n�a�ll ���\ᙠ8b|��=����v������>�l��i���}:��^�� dvs��n��<�<���s<� �/,�ݔy�o��z��"����-�x��ets�bc���~h�0�pd�<����f��7���q��sg��qǭتut�ւ���fn~�i0> �l�d��cy,xw#��h���g�e��� �lܸd|0������d���uޑ��c�h�ϐpڑ�w�>��ufіe%��=qv���q�90`����ǚ��ȱ����r���@x pf�������]6h�:�eu��vv�d�^(g�pl%st���e�5�@��(ً�0��$�$��e�$}�ns��;{/,�,� ��p-�jyt�����k~�" �q0�t��pϣ���>#�̙v��=ˀ<������ݥ�v�h[$�t�ih��o��-x��j�<4.��<�=�
mr �q��.��5��������qͯ��!e�(��c82��q�#�w.dx�җ<}�/sy.d�0u�.:i5���ܣ$��j�yh�k��v\�����[����a��!�k3�ɗ�tz >�λz��`%���n88�zt��"h�r��8 ^so�
�
y�s�izv�wq:��ud�m;�y�s�.�}������j�d�{�j��s�n�u���ү{���q4�iu�5�u̲0ks��\�7x�\5���i�/��z77'd]����u��j�1��b�x�u͞�ڽc��3���iu�2s;緬g8���:?��g-,
gs���~un��f�c(m�r�t
jxi�d=�dec�n���pk!
ѐ��'theme/theme/_rels/thememanager.xml.rels��m
�0���wooӻ�&݈э���5
6?$q��
�,.�a��i����c2�1h�:�q��m��@rn��;d�`��o7�g�k(m&$r(.1�r'j��њt���8��v�"��aȼ�h�u}��|�$�b{��p����8�g/]�qasم(����#��l�[������pk-!����[content_types].xmlpk-!�֧��60_rels/.relspk-!ky���theme/theme/thememanager.xmlpk-!�r���theme/theme/theme1.xmlpk-!
ѐ��'� theme/theme/_rels/thememanager.xml.relspk]�
�i(����� 6f
r�7 #(�,�136�: ?�c1g3lvmto�p�q�#�) ,-./12345689:;<>?@c6�:�n#�*07=�@� @���������h ��0�( �
����0�( �
��b
�s���� ?�%)��fmszj o �
�
�
9dfijq��������t } **�2�2�2�2�2�2"7*7�;�;�;�;?"?gara�b�b-c2cd)dddkd�d�d�e�e�e�e}f�f0g9glhrh�i�i�i�i�i�i�i�i�i* {.�.�i�i3,��=^�)*�;�;�b�b�i�i�i�i�i�i�i�i�i()ssq q ^ ^ �
�
11ff����t t v%v%**�2�2�2�2�;�;�bc(c2c3c3c=c�c�c�c�cndododxdkdldldvd�d�d�d�d�e�e�e�e�e�e�e�e�f�f�f�fggg$g9g:g:gdg�g�g�g�g7h8h8hahrhshsh]h�h�h�h�hjikikiti`iaiaiki�i�i�i��q04e��n[g],-�o�����`<|��o";0ri1�%�rrsui��w�i�={u�,� uz*�m� �r=��-9h�s��eme�.~��
{r�v�4�1l2q �"�iaha��og>�u��`�1_%v��nh{��q��u�3�d]-�z:kkkkn;�q0�<�?*�7��:a��^b� �l{��2h�(�#!�q��m4-~cqrrs�4>�p]�sao-�?��yn�b~i�(��)ib��>!]�.�`
rv:g&>!��}n!�l��2�"�0r��\�|�md-%;�blrbr]�a
6ji� ��vj�`�[jo 5j90�ry �:[�
k 3q-r�jx 8i� tp� k�|�2~�
��y��k�
?i��� *�?=��#??*�@�4le�dw"
���z�g�kd�2�^e�-h�x�w��t�bs &�x�-z�y��w�i�>�:-��u
kkkkdw"
q�x�-h�
k^r�
�^�vxb�
�=#�/y�pur ����
��i�'ff�x-z�d�y�(��)fk{z��fv��-�p�'�e���4�!~q�2h`�?i��be��@��fk-<"��l�q�u��y/�x{��]^�~76=&����`
[� ��rh&<�^��oc!��d{�/�"���[��h�2��d���t��w�8i� (f�tl(����}�t�a9�~�8��7l��4�";�g)n��p7v}g�xd|��&�h�w�a�g�b�u�d\*�)#jb�l�d�
)r�}��w�gl$l��r�qh� v���/xcz.�^m~;�|p%�fzps7l�ps�#���<>)��s��vj��h5h 5� a�l[�x� xcz�be�y�*fdxl�y��raj>�n�cr%v��h�a9�� !`��}<�q�}q =�7y]��r�-��.��zf�7��
�e�o[kh,~�hmpm~�mg�=�j��>m�?[%��'w�jo8�l�y2\gqwez ��p]74�`a��m�!�|z��z:�*��b!�g;cq�qq�h�nk^r a�x�t
an�gap�y8��x���s��d���z��j�vzq��t\
~��av'po�_m4�i�w��tkpb�`
rq1��yn�pur �p}��� urep�&>!�z[fxx)!�o0!�b!x{�ec!�t�k��oc!�v�>b(p!� ]!�3�l��!nr�q�m�!�j#�_�!g-�!�f�d�[z"�u&z�6'�"�zy�q �"ji�_��m�"� ]!�&�"�)��/�"|z�s\�"=v�g��~#�)9~��k#�� �i3#�#?�=#�i\;�j#p%�sh�#���2k�#�|�#ry �ps�#pb��9�#�sa�d $��yj!4$�`�%�qg$�ep$�"e<@v�$:*�$�[��p�$�]'��?[>�?z]%�`�%vd�i1�%�lyk-,�%�,�=��l�%�z�@�x�%�!0��e&poq�bs &�b*&t�(6=&�'w�rh&2\�qp&nyvc��t�&��&�]'�ep$�tw�'~d:(�r�'�kl��>�'��5�l�'�taz��w(r�@�~d:(�_(it~tl(�x�,�dm�(�t�(�pi�(��]�a#�(�j�`�<>)^e��w)!,�f���)�l�%��)mq{�"*�^�i��le*^l�x�ne*n9��^�*�:8t��[? �v ��o�(s� qh� �`� q�f�� {p���c,@�i��#,�dq[mk, @p�qb,�d&d��,�>m��x�,�{u�,�@�q>,-�m4-rt�h�fk-�r�-�j�n�2@�-�ggc���-x*�y��:�-��->o.-dt��t�.��z]�.�x��<}7/d|���y/ds}���/: o=tj�/0�u0{z�o�!0�ran 0gy|�5j90�$�}�;1�0��e��1fw2
�z��>2"o�m�29!"e�w�2�f\�h�2n�~�w�3ui�� �3dj�u�3��xc]�4@�4�;�4�d5��p�4@l�5h 5�^b^�
-a5�pv5�d5tw�'��5��5md-�b�5i�d��v�5
-a5�a
6�`d�#6ghch�81�6�&7��6�a�r!�6q1���@�6xx�6)1:t�&7�x�\�~74\�7bd9t=r�7��gr
f8c�]��jo8�~�8���8��b�n9?oi�q�9�a:�kx_�s�:kkkk�3�:�!�q�o";�4mjjo;�i\;�%�|c;�q��viu;�ru�;�~7�[u�u�`fr>�>�'i�>r]��v�>lrb�*?�mt?<#iq!{�?p[5=�tf�?�t�&�?�*��o-�?�mt?�s�?
u|3e�?�-x{�8�?�@}��*.}@��)��-�@�t�`�r�@g��z�@z]%hag;��:a�s6ay8���doahu��yaa(�a�le*�&e�ana��.�an��l$b�a�'�c$,&d]�l�d|1�q�i�dbl#g�>e�\���ez�v�n�e�v ��'�e�#�c�hfs�]�=bdf�^^n��z[f�y���f�"�o w~g� l`�#�g�{9=��g=v�g�o�t�{s
h�-h�pv5p@h�og�ghch'\l��&�h�t�e�hoaq�!~q��y#%�q@gku�nr�q�q��qqg$�r)b;r�,�q��0hr�l��zwr�
{r;1�0��y{r�i�r�� �(u�r�$atxcs�#sw/�=fzps8ts)b;r��ts�#�g3%�s�{�s�;�4��g/t�4>�:8t�gn�bd9t]z[t� �m��td $�`�t�s��,!u�rdi�@gku�u0
g�u���uxcs>�uc;�r�xbvxyyv�d�^�v4�o�v�j$w�w�w�6�x�m�2:3�x�q�y���x�3�:��o�x�#s^l�x\<�jg�xq>,- q�x�}<��x_/,j�zy��t��`-y<myv��q�yv^mc���y<z�&xfk{z�kd
�zhp��[�enx�:[�=�^�`
[%qw[�0�[(>y�2�[�f\�?\i�(��\�m��x�\~�f<1/�\�s���7y]�>aqs�]���c�]hv�i���]viu;�]^ph$^�^b^�`.�^�=�^�1_�kx_�a9�ji�_l{�� !`�qb,�� l`�y`� ��t�`�=�}�j�`�qq��u�`�>�`_m�t
a��&na[mk,�9a��q���a��5��>�asq�y�3j�a�zwr�a�t�3b@�z��)ib�u~b1�h��u�b�~#�%;�b@v�$03cd.�b�ggcg-�!�va�c�^����c(�a�u�c�0hr��#�c�j$wvd0q|�`d�d&d�@�m�f�d,-�zn�d�|�#�9!"e2k�#�g e�/e� *^ee����l\e�>e��eme�hgqwe�u
�t�edu�efd��&fji�,\f<}7/��zfs{tq�f3%�s!,�fqx{~�fxx�6�a�f6�f<z�bl#g�^blkqg�j9r��g8|k=�z�g�-9h�k?oi�u�<mebi�rdi�b*&��b~i�y{r4�i�`-y�^�ix�u�nf�i�~7djtj�/v,�j�8�?�j�jw�j�`�t�=�j�4�q\<�j�dk�g�tkzl!{�?�klv:g��3�l<|�<ie�lj l�^(m��k��.�mz*�ma�� �m�hn�y`�gn��!�g)nfr>��^^nv��,mn�kj>�nh#�n�g�nv'po�
���"�o�"�o6gp�e�oh��.�o�r��v�omg���o]z[thptf�?(ap(s� @p�[? bep=r�7�c�p�qp&��dq�vzq� �<#iq�!�q� ���qq =��,�q�w�#!�q{s
h�4�q�a�f�l�q|1�q6s�~r�q3q-rie�l��j9r �3�c;�rn[g� �r�-�@�y0�sb(p!��s{fm-dt�y�)1:to
�v�$at�6�x� 0w?0w?0w?0w?�.�t�/e��t(ap�}�t�o�t�u2�&xph$^�enx�z�x[�x,mnf�x&xn
�x�0�<�=.y6�f�� oyrgox*�y�x�u��yd]-sq�y7���yxl�y�t�.��y];yw��y�w��n�y�u&z�*n{��tazr=��whkzjx �.tzji��z@�z�.�o���z�`�o��%�z�q�wv{�nh{$,&d�*n{�s�?mq{
hr{��6�jbs{�-x{qx{�@�6m�{�d��0q|�~�vgy|��s�
u|�[|�w)�\�| w~g;�|�g ek�|�.�t�y>�|b�5�ds}xyyv�p}�r>�$�}dm�(�m�}j<�v��=�}jbs{�q�}\
~�=�h,~03c��)9~whkzit~�;�~j{�~0�n�n�~l�s{t�<(>y\*�4e�z �j�{p�4\�7��(k�i����x��m�j������q[w�3`2 r� �p
j^�n�_ati�wb��[�.h j<sh�to>s�r#�l$�h%�}&�m'�m(�)�g)%j,�p.�i/�)1�2�z2'4t4.6�6*8;i8cj8�9�i;�e=k&>e!@jj@r7a�b�ec�nd�udvf0i�ai4tj�kul%man�%smkxgy�py�]�^ro_5a�7ahc
2e�lf�qf�)gjmi�ckalthllmnnm}on.^p�!q�yq[r�is�ps0@ui1vywicy�xy|�x}6l~�/�wt�mw��=��=��`�j�nj��9��l�.~��l�v��'��i�=h��j��~�du�� �=i�fj�to�4��m�t��j��2�)w���lz�od�w#���c��;�7�u<�[��/�3��t��r�������u\�cb��^�v�j ��\�a�vi�|w�r�����$?��n��
��!�s/����8�*��-��_�$-��f�><����r��c�`�7"����s�?5����"�gl�bj�h��-���
��"�l%�w�p���2��]������y����e���`-�|��i�i�@�)))4bc�h�i�@�j��@�@��unknown������������g��.�[x� �times new roman5��symbol3.��.�[x� �arial7.���[ @�verdana;���(�[sosimsun9,����|�8i{�~ light?�����|�8i{�~dengxiana����$b�cambria math 1��h;"�f���g�{�>%��>%�a-!),.:;?]}���� & 6"0000 00
00000��� ������=�@�\�]�^���([{� 0
000000��;�[�����������i�i 3�q��@p��?�����������������������"�2!xx�������user
sppm-lib01��
�����oh�� '��0x������� ��
,8@hp�usernormalsppm-lib01218microsoft office word@��4@�y��\�@���g���>��
��՜.�� ,��0�
x`t|�������microsoft�%�i
!"#$%&'()* ,-./0123456789:;<=>?@abcd����fghijkl����nopqrstuvwxyz[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx����z{|}~���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������root entry�������� �f���g����data
������������e1table����m5wworddocument����2�summaryinformation(������������ydocumentsummaryinformation8���������compobj������������n������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
���� �fmicrosoft word 97-2003 �ĵ�
msworddocword.document.8�9�q