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volume 101, issue 4, june 2011
1. title: unemployment, vacancies, wages.
authors: diamond, peter
abstract: the article considers the use of search theory in economics in relationship to research on wages, unemployment and other aspects of labor economics. economic models of prices are considered in terms of how relatively small search costs may have a large impact on prices. the long-term unemployment generated among workers by the recession following the global financial crisis is examined. disparities between job vacancies and hiring in various industries including health care, education and construction and the effect of those disparities are considered.
2. title: markets with search friction and the dmp model.
authors: mortensen, dale t.
abstract: the article considers the role of search frictions in economics and the functioning of markets. search frictions are defined as the time and costs incurred by buyers and sellers in the course of obtaining the information necessary to complete a transaction. trading in commodity futures is cited as an example of a market where search frictions have been reduced to the lowest possible minimum, but it is noted that the labor and housing markets retain considerable search and matching costs due to the heterogeneous nature of those transactions. mathematical models related to job vacancies, unemployment and wages are described.
3. title: equilibrium in the labor market with search frictions.
authors: pissarides, christopher a.
abstract: the article considers the role of search frictions in labor market economics. the development of formal mathematical models involving search frictions such as the phillips curve is discussed. the definition of unemployment used in search theory is examined. the concept of "matching" in job hunting in which both the worker and employer are seeking suitable qualities in each other beyond the issue of wages is introduced and discussed. the beverage curve equilibrium for unemployment is considered. the impact of employment protection legislation on unemployment is examined.
4. title: the role of trading frictions in real asset markets.
authors: gavazza, alessandro.
abstract: this paper investigates how trading frictions vary with the thickness of the asset market by examining patterns of asset allocations and prices in commercial aircraft markets. the empirical analysis indicates that assets with a thinner market are less liquid--i.e., more difficult to sell. thus, firms hold on longer to them amid profitability shocks. hence, when markets for assets are thin, firms' average productivity and capacity utilization are lower, and the dispersions of productivity and of capacity utilization are higher. in turn, prices of assets with a thin market are lower and have a higher dispersion.
5. title: read all about it!! what happens following a technology shock?
authors: alexopoulos, michelle
abstract: existing indicators of technical change are plagued by shortcomings. i present new measures based on books published in the field of technology that resolve many of these problems and use them to identify the impact of technology shocks on economic activity. they are positively linked to changes in r&d and scientific knowledge, and capture the new technologies' commercialization dates. changes in information technology are found to be important sources of economic fluctuations in the post-wwii period, and total factor productivity, investment, and, to a lesser extent, labor are all shown to increase following a positive technology shock.
6. title: choice inconsistencies among the elderly: evidence from plan choice in the medicare part d program.
authors: abaluck, jason; gruber, jonathan
abstract: we evaluate the choices of elders across their insurance options under the medicare part d prescription drug plan, using a unique dataset of prescription drug claims matched to information on the characteristics of choice sets. we document that elders place much more weight on plan premiums than on expected out-of-pocket costs; value plan financial characteristics beyond any impacts on their own financial expenses or risk; and place almost no value on variance-reducing aspects of plans. partial equilibrium welfare analysis implies that welfare would have been 27 percent higher if patients had all chosen rationally.
7. title: participation.
authors: charness, gary; dufwenberg, martin.
abstract: we show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a pareto-improving outcome. communication is effective (and pat terns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. we examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-from-blame.
8. title: what do trade negotiators negotiate about? empirical evidence from the world trade organization.
authors: bagwell, kyle; staiger, robert w.
abstract: according to the terms-of-trade theory, governments use trade agreements to escape from a terms-of-trade-driven prisoner's dilemma. we use the terms-of-trade theory to develop a relationship that predicts negotiated tariff levels on the basis of pre-negotiation data: tariffs, import volumes and prices, and trade elasticities. we then confront this predicted relationship with data on the outcomes of tariff negotiations associated with the accession of new members to the world trade organization. we find strong and robust support for the central predictions of the terms-of-trade theory in the observed pattern of negotiated tariff cuts.
9. title: electoral accountability and corruption: evidence from the audits of local governments.
authors: ferraz, claudio; finan, frederico.
abstract: we show that political institutions affect corruption levels. we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior.
10. title: r&d investment, exporting, and productivity dynamics.
authors: aw, bee yan; roberts, mark j; xu, daniel yi.
abstract: this paper estimates a dynamic structural model of a producer's decision to invest in r&d and export, allowing both choices to endogenously affect the future path of productivity. using plant-level data for the taiwanese electronics industry, both activities are found to have a positive effect on the plant's future productivity. this in turn drives more plants to self-select into both activities, contributing to further productivity gains. simulations of an expansion of the export market are shown to increase both exporting and r&d investment and generate a gradual within-plant productivity improvement.
11. title: linking conflict to inequality and polarization.
authors: esteban, joan; ray, debraj.
abstract: in this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. we show that a suitable monotone transform of the equilibrium level of conflict can be proxied by a linear function of the gini coefficient, the herfindahl-hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due to esteban and ray.
12. title: using loopholes to reveal the marginal cost of regulation: the case of fuel-economy standards.
authors: anderson, soren t; sallee, james m.
abstract: estimating the cost of regulation is difficult. firms sometimes reveal costs indirectly, however, when they exploit loopholes to avoid regulation. we apply this insight to fuel economy standards for automobiles. these standards feature a loophole that gives automakers a bonus when they equip a vehicle with flexible-fuel capacity. profit-maximizing automakers will equate the marginal cost of compliance using the loophole, which is observable, with the unobservable costs of strategies that genuinely improve fuel economy. based on this insight, we estimate that tightening standards by one mile per gallon would have cost automakers just $9--$27 per vehicle in recent years.
13. title: strike three: discrimination, incentives, and evaluation.
authors: parsons, christopher a; sulaeman, johan; yates, michael c; hamermesh, daniel s.
abstract: major league baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic prefer ences when they evaluate pitchers. strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e.g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. these direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. the results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. they imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination.
14. title: the inflation-output trade-off with downward wage rigidities.
authors: benigno, pierpaolo; antonio ricci, luca.
abstract: the macroeconomic implications of downward nominal wage rigidities are analyzed via a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. a closed-form solution for a long-run phillips curve relates average output gap to average wage inflation: it is virtually vertical at high inflation and flattens at low inflation. macroeconomic volatility shifts the curve outwards and reduces output. the results imply that stabilization policies play an important role, and that optimal inflation may be positive and differ across countries with different macroeconomic volatility. results are robust to relaxing the wage constraint, for example, when large idiosyncratic shocks arise.
15. title: education and labor market discrimination.
authors: lang, kevin; manove, michael.
abstract: using a model of statistical discrimination and educational sorting, we explain why blacks get more education than whites of similar cognitive ability, and we explore how the armed forces qualification test (afqt), wages, and education are related. the model suggests that one should control for both afqt and education when comparing the earnings of blacks and whites, in which case a substantial black-white wage differential emerges. we reject the hypothesis that differences in school quality between blacks and whites explain the wage and education differentials. our findings support the view that some of the black-white wage differential reflects the operation of the labor market.
16. title: face value.
authors: eckel, catherine c; petrie, ragan.
abstract: people pay attention to the appearance of others, and personal characteristics can affect many types of decisions. we ask, is there informational value in a face in a situation where trust and reciprocity can increase earnings? we use a laboratory trust game experiment where subjects are unable to observe a counterpart, must observe a counterpart, or can pay to reveal a counterpart's photograph. both senders and responders are willing to pay to observe the photos, and we show that behavior, earnings, and efficiency are affected. when subjects are ''face to face,'' efficiency is enhanced, and senders have higher earnings.
17. title: term premia and inflation uncertainty: empirical evidence from an international panel dataset.
authors: wright, jonathan h.
abstract: this paper provides cross-country empirical evidence on term premia. i construct a panel of zero-coupon nominal government bond yields spanning ten industrialized countries and nearly two decades. i hence compute forward rates and use two different methods to decompose these forward rates into expected future short-term interest rates and term premiums. the first method uses an affine term structure model with macroeconomic variables as unspanned risk factors; the second method uses surveys. i find that term premiums declined internationally over the sample period, especially in countries that apparently reduced inflation uncertainty by making substantial changes in their monetary policy frameworks.
18. title: asymmetric information, adverse selection and online disclosure: the case of ebay motors.
authors: lewis, gregory.
abstract: since akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. the remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private information on the auction web page. this defines a precise contract -- to deliver the car shown for the closing price -- which helps protect the buyer from adverse selection. i test this theory using data from ebay motors, finding that online disclosures are important price determinants, and that disclosure costs impact both the level of disclosure and prices.
19. title: ambiguity models and the machina paradoxes.
authors: baillon, aur��lien; l'haridon, olivier; placido, laetitia.
abstract: machina (2009) introduced two examples that falsify choquet expected utility, presently one of the most popular models of ambiguity. this article shows that machina's examples falsify not only the model mentioned, but also four other popular models for ambiguity of the literature, namely maxmin expected utility, variational preferences, ��-maxmin, and the smooth model of ambiguity aversion. thus, machina's examples pose a challenge to most of the present field of ambiguity. finally, the paper discusses how an alternative representation of ambiguity-averse preferences works to accommodate the machina paradoxes and what drives the results.
20. title: optimal policy intervention and the social value of public information.
authors: james, jonathan g; lawler, phillip.
abstract: svensson (2006) argues that morris and shin (2002) is, contrary to what is claimed, pro-transparency. this paper reexamines the issue but with an important modification to the original morris and shin framework. recognizing that central banks impact the economy not only indirectly via public announcements, but also directly through policy actions, we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention. our results strengthen morris and shin's conclusions considerably: in particular, we find that public disclosure of the central bank's information is unambiguously, i.e., regardless of parameter values, undesirable.
21. title: why do payment card networks charge proportional fees?
authors: shy, oz; wang, zhu.
abstract: this paper explains why payment card networks charge fees that are proportional to the transaction values instead of charging fixed per-transaction fees. we show that, when card networks and merchants both have market power, card networks earn higher profits by charging proportional fees. it is also shown that competition among merchants reduces card networks' gains from using proportional fees relative to fixed per-transaction fees. merchants are found to earn lower profits under proportional fees, whereas consumer utility and social welfare are higher. our welfare results are then evaluated with respect to the current regulatory policy debates.
22. title: information and prices with capacity constraints.
authors: lester, benjamin.
abstract: in the theoretical literature on consumer search, one conclusion is nearly universal: as buyers become better able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium. in this paper, i examine a standard consumer search model with one small -- yet often relevant -- additional restriction: i assume that sellers are capacity constrained. in this environment, i illustrate that the conventional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold: having more informed consumers can lead to a decrease in prices, have no effect at all, or even lead to an increase in prices.
23. title: group size and incentives to contribute: a natural experiment at chinese wikipedia.
authors: zhang, xiaoquan (michael); zhu, feng.
abstract: the literature on the private provision of public goods suggests an inverse relationship between incentives to contribute and group size. we find, however, that after an exogenous reduction of group size at chinese wikipedia, the nonblocked contributors decrease their contributions by 42.8 percent on average. we attribute the cause to social effects: contributors receive social benefits that increase with both the amount of their contributions and group size, and the shrinking group size weakens these social benefits. consistent with our explanation, we find that the more contributors value social benefits, the more they reduce their contributions after the block.
24. title: fertility and the personal exemption: comment.
authors: crump, richard; shah goda, gopi; mumford, kevin j.
abstract: one of the most commonly cited studies on the effect of child subsidies on fertility, whittington, alm, and peters (1990), claimed a large positive effect of child tax benefits on fertility using time series methods. we revisit this question in light of recent increases in child tax benefits by replicating this earlier study and extending the analysis. we do not find strong evidence to justify the model specification from the original paper. moreover, even if the original specification is appropriate, we show that the results are not robust to more general measures of child tax benefits.
25. title: returns to education: evidence from uk twins: comment.
authors: amin, vikesh.
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