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��ࡱ�>�� ^`����]��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������u �r�3bjbj�n�n24��a��a� �������""������������8�4-�0olaaaaauuu�n�n�n�n�n�n�n$�p�rs<�n-�uuuuu�n��aa4�n���ur�a�a�n�u�n���a�����;g���������no00o��sf�s���0�s�{kuu�uuuuu�n�ni�uuu0ouuuu���������������������������������������������������������������������suuuuuuuuu"q s: journal of political economy volume 132, issue 4, april 2024 1. title: the supply-side effects of monetary policy. authors: baqaee, david r.; farhi, emmanuel; sangani, kunal. abstract: we propose a supply-side channel for the transmission of monetary policy. we show that when high-markup firms have lower pass-throughs than low-markup firms, then positive demand shocks, such as monetary expansions, alleviate cross-sectional misallocation by reallocating resources to high-markup firms. consequently, positive "demand shocks" are accompanied by endogenous positive "supply shocks" that raise productivity and lower inflation. we derive a tractable, four-equation model where monetary shocks generate hump-shaped productivity responses. in our calibration, the supply-side effect amplifies the total impact of monetary shocks on output by about 70%. we provide empirical evidence validating our model's predictions using identified monetary shocks. 2. title: impacts of a large-scale parenting program: experimental evidence from chile. authors: carneiro, pedro; galasso, emanuela; garcia, italo lopez; bedregal, paula; cordero, miguel. abstract: we present results from a large-scale experimental evaluation of a national parenting program in chile. the program is low cost: it lasts only 6�8 weeks, and it is administered to groups of eight to 12 parents. it is implemented by the national health system, taking advantage of its existing physical infrastructure and human resources. we find that 3 years after the interventions ends, children whose parents are offered the opportunity to participate in this program increase their vocabulary and socioemotional development scores by 0.1 standard deviations, mirrored by similar improvements in caregiver's parenting behaviors and beliefs. 3. title: the abcs of firm heterogeneity when firms sort into markets: the case of exporters. authors: blum, bernardo s.; claro, sebastian; horstmann, ignatius; rivers, david a. abstract: we develop a novel methodology for disentangling the demand and cost drivers of firm heterogeneity when firms sort themselves into different markets, and we apply it to export status differences. our methodology results in joint estimates of firm-level productivity and of markups in every market, without imposing functional form restrictions on demand. we find that exporters, relative to nonexporters, (i) have flatter domestic demand curves�thicker domestic markets�and (ii) have higher demand conditional on productivity. finally, (iii) these demand advantages translate to foreign markets, thereby leading to export status differences. 4. title: a theory of stock exchange competition and innovation: will the market fix the market? authors: budish, eric; lee, robin s.; shim, john j. abstract: will stock exchanges innovate to address latency arbitrage and the arms race for speed? this paper models how exchanges compete in the modern electronic era and how this shapes incentives for market-design innovation. in the status quo, exchange trading fees are competitive, but exchanges earn economic rents from selling speed. these rents create a wedge between private and social incentives to innovate and support the persistence of an inefficient market design in equilibrium of a market-design adoption game. we discuss implications for policy and insights for the literatures on market design, innovation, and platforms. 5. title: mediated collusion. authors: ortner, juan; sugaya, takuo; wolitzky, alexander. abstract: cartels and bidding rings are often facilitated by intermediaries, who recommend prices/bids to firms and can impose penalties (such as reverting to competitive behavior in future interactions) if these recommendations are not followed. motivated by such cases, we study correlated equilibria in first-price procurement auctions with complete information, where bidders who disobey their recommendations are penalized. cartel-optimal profit is greater when more information about submitted bids is disclosed at auction and when the maximum penalty is larger. when only the winner's identity is disclosed (or the winner's identity and bid), cartels do not benefit from mediation. our main result characterizes the cartel-optimal equilibrium with two symmetric bidders when both bids are disclosed. the optimal equilibrium involves extensive randomization and displays tied bids and high winning bids with positive probability, even when the maximum penalty is very small. the stationary mediation schemes we consider are always more profitable for the cartel than bid rotation. 6. title: improving the organization of knowledge in production by screening problems. authors: carmona, guilherme; laohakunakorn, krittanai. abstract: we extend garicano's model of optimal organizations by allowing problems to be screened. we show that when screening is as costly as solving problems, optimal organizations are hierarchies as in garicano's model, but when the cost of screening is small, workers screen all problems that they and the top managers cannot solve, those problems that they screen are sent directly to those who can solve them, and those problems that they neither solve nor screen are passed to the top managers. for intermediate values of the screening cost, the optimal organization is a hybrid of the above forms. 7. title: repricing avalanches. authors: nirei, makoto; scheinkman, jos� a. abstract: we present a menu-cost pricing model with a large but finite number n of firms. a firm's nominal price increase lowers other firms' relative prices, thereby inducing further nominal price increases. the distribution of these "repricing avalanches" converges as n �! 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